Abstract. We introduce the high-degree indicator matrix (HDIM), an object closely related with both the linear approximation table and the algebraic normal form (ANF) of a permutation. We show that the HDIM of a Feistel Network contains very specific patterns depending on the degree of the Feistel functions, the number of rounds and whether the Feistel functions are 1-to-1 or not. We exploit these patterns to distinguish Feistel Networks, even if the Feistel Network is whitened using unknown affine layers. We also present a new type of structural attack exploiting monomials that cannot be present at round − 1 to recover the ANF of the last Feistel function of a -round Feistel Network. Finally, we discuss the relations between our findings, integral attacks, cube attacks, Todo's division property and the congruence modulo 4 of the Linear Approximation Table. 
Introduction
While the importance of attacks targeting actual primitives is obvious, structural attacks can also lead to interesting development. In fact, the last few years have seen the publications of several such attacks. For example, the attack targeting the SASAS construction has been recently extended to larger constructions [1] . The ASASA structure, which might look weaker at first glance due to its lower number of non-linear layers, has actually proved to be a challenging target; it was even proposed as the basis for public key encryption and white-box scheme [2] . Attacking this generic structure requires sophisticated methods presented in [3] and [4] . Feistel Networks have also been the target of generic attacks in two different settings. If the Feistel functions are completely secret, attacks up to 5-rounds are presented in [5] . If the Feistel functions consist in public functions preceded by the addition of a secret key, powerful attacks with very low data complexity are presented in [6] .
As illustrated by the usage of the ASASA structure, generic constructions can be applied in white-box cryptography where the aim is to prevent an attacker from having access to some of the inner components of the algorithm to perform some computations. Thus, structural attacks are important in this context. They can also be used to reverse-engineer the secret structure of an S-Box, allowing for example an attacker to enjoy the benefits of a lightweight implementation known a priori only by the designer of the S-Box. The use of small Feistel Networks for lightweight S-Box design is investigated in [7] and, in fact, a secret hardware efficient decomposition 3 was recently discovered for the S-Box of the last Russian standards [8] using such reverse-engineering.
Our Contribution Our results are based on the high-degree indicator matrix (HDIM), a new object we introduce. We associate to any -bit permutation a × Boolean matrixˆ( ) which can be computed in time O( 2 −1 ) using the full code-book and which is related all at once to the LAT/Walsh spectrum of , to its algebraic normal form and to the existence of integral distinguishers.
The HDIM provides new attack directions which we illustrate by analysing some generic constructions based on Feistel Networks. In particular, we show the existence of some patterns in the HDIM of 2 -bit Feistel Networks with rounds and Feistel functions with degree depending on ( , ) with ( , ) = ⌊ /2⌋−1 + ⌈ /2⌉−1 .
These patterns provide efficient distinguishers for such structures. When the round functions are bijective, such patterns always exist in Feistel Networks with up to at least 5 round. We also show that these distinguishers can be interpreted as particular integral distinguishers and describe some relations between our results and Todo's division property [9] . Due to their integral nature, our distinguishers are extremely memory efficient: we only need to store a block containing the sum studied. In contrast, the impossible differential for 5-round Feistel Network [10] and the yoyo-game [5] are the best known distinguishers for 5-rounds FN with bijective Feistel functions and require respectively O(2 ) and O(2 2 ) blocks of memory. We also present a new type of recovery attack against Feistel Networks with secret round functions which rebuilds the last Feistel function by exploiting the predictable absence of some monomials in the algebraic normal form of the permutation without its last round.
Outline We first describe the definitions and notations that we shall use throughout the paper in Section 2. Then, we investigate in Section 3 the relation between the different rows and columns of a table containing the congruence modulo 4 of the biases in the LAT of some -bit permutation and, in doing so, introduce and study the high-degree indicator matrix (HDIM). Section 4 shows that the HDIM 
Notations and Boolean Functions Basics
In this section, we introduce the notations and concepts that will be used throughout the paper. A thorough introduction to Boolean functions can be found in [13] . First, let us define some sets and simple operations:
-F 2 denotes the finite field of size 2, -the exclusive-OR (or XOR) is denoted ⊕, -the logical AND is denoted ∧, -the hamming weight hw( ) of a vector of F 2 is the number of ones in , -| | and # denote the size of a set , -the scalar product of two elements = ( 0 , ..., −1 ) and = ( 0 , ..., −1 ) of F 2 is denoted "·" and is equal to
=0
, and -if = ( 0 , ..., −1 ) and = ( 0 , ..., −1 ) are two elements of F 2 then is true if and only if ( = 0 =⇒ = 0) is true for all in [0, − 1]. We say that "covers" .
We now define some of the key components used in our analysis.
Definition 1 (Boolean Function).
We call Boolean function a function mapping F 2 to F 2 . A function mapping F 2 to F 2 is a vectorial Boolean function and its restrictions to each output bit are its coordinates. Finally, for a vectorial Boolean function , the Boolean functions ↦ → · ( ) are its components.
Note that a coordinate of a Boolean function is one of its components but that the converse is not necessarily true. Let us then introduce the concept of balancedness.
Definition 2 (Balanced Boolean Function). A (vectorial) Boolean function
mapping F 2 to F 2 is said to be balanced if the size of the preimages of all elements of F 2 are equal.
A Boolean function is balanced if and only if all of its components are balanced.
We also recall the definition of the Algebraic Normal Form of a Boolean function.
Definition 3 (Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)). Any Boolean function mapping bits to 1 can be decomposed into
in a unique fashion which is called the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of . The coefficients can be obtained using the so-called Möbius transform. For vectorial Boolean functions, the ANF is the ANF of each of the coordinates.
Definition 4 (Algebraic Degree). The algebraic degree of a Boolean function is the largest number of variables in a single term of its ANF, i.e. the maximum hamming weight of all of F 2 such that ̸ = 0. The algebraic degree of a vectorial Boolean function is the maximum algebraic degree of its coordinates. The algebraic degree of a (vectorial) Boolean function is denoted deg( ).
We observe that the algebraic degree of a permutation of bits is at most equal to − 1.
Our analysis will involve the LAT or Fourier Transform (related to the Walsh spectrum by a constant multiplication) of a Boolean function. These almost identical concepts are introduced below.
Definition 5 (LAT, Fourier Transform, Walsh Spectrum). The Linear Approximation Table of a function mapping bits to is a 2 × 2 matrix ℒ where
can equivalently be expressed as follows:
where the first sum corresponds to the Fourier transform of ↦ → · ( ) and the second to its Walsh spectrum. 
Patterns in Biases Modulo 4 and HDIM
Our initial goal was to identify new generic attacks against Feistel Networks. As suggested in [12] , we looked at a visual representation of the Linear Approximation Table of such permutations. We identified some patterns which turned out to be byproducts of a strong structure in the congruence modulo 4 of the biases. Figures 1a and 1b show the "Pollock representation" of the LAT modulo 4 of a 4-and a 5-round 6-bit Feistel Networks for some bijective Feistel functions picked uniformly at random. As we can see, the congruence of the biases is constant in each square of dimensions 8 × 8 for the 4-round Feistel Networks. Furthermore, there seems to be linear patterns for the 5-round structure: if we divide the LAT into 8 × 8 squares as before then we find that each square at position ( , ) is the sum of the squares at positions ( , 0) and (0, ) and a square-wise constant.
The reason behind these patterns is two-fold. The first aspect is a generic observation about the linearity (in some sense) of the construction of the LAT modulo 4. Indeed, we show in this section that the function ( , ) ↦ → (ℒ[ , ] mod 4) for the LAT ℒ of a permutation is a bilinear form and that its matrix representation has interesting properties. The second aspect of the justification for the patterns is the probability 1 presence of zeroes in some positions which is discussed later in Section 4.
The High-Degree Indicator Matrix
We first re-write the congruence modulo 4 of the biases in the LAT of a permutation using Boolean functions.
Lemma 1 (LAT modulo 4). Let be a permutation of bits ( > 2) and let
Proof.
The first term in this sum is equal to 2 −1 as every component of a permutation is balanced. 4 Thus, if we look at the congruence modulo 4 of ℒ[ , ], we obtain the following (for any > 2):
from which we deduce that
As sum and XOR are equivalent modulo 2, this proves the lemma.
⊓ ⊔
This lemma has several consequences regarding the congruence modulo 4 of the LAT coefficients of (or, alternatively, the congruence modulo 2 of their half). First, we define ℒ 4 to be a 2 × 2 matrix such that 
As consequence, the function (
is a bilinear form and can be represented using an × matrixˆ( ).
Definition 6 (High-Degree Indicator Matrix (HDIM)). Let be anbit permutation and let (ℒ) be the Boolean matrix representing the congruence modulo 4 of its LAT (as described above). We define the High-Degree Indicator Matrixˆ( ) of to be the × matrix such that
where is an all zero -bit vector with a single 1 at position . This matrix is such that 
=0
.
⊓ ⊔
This lemma is the reason behind the name "high-degree indicator matrix". Indeed, the HDIM coefficients simply state whether each of the possible − 1 degree terms appear in each coordinate of or not.
We finally note that the HDIM of a function can be computed much more efficiently than the LAT or the difference distribution table. Indeed, we can compute a column of the HDIM by summing the function over a cube of dimension − 1 (see Section 6.1). The complexity for all columns is therefore 2 −1 .
Some Properties of the High-Degree Indicator Matrix
Let us investigate the effect of some simple transformations on the HDIM. First, we point out that due to the fact that the LAT of the inverse of a permutation is the transpose of the LAT of , the HDIM of −1 is the transpose of the HDIM of .
We now show that the HDIM of ∘ ∘ can easily be deduced from that of when and are -bit linear permutations. The corresponding theorem will be used in Section 4.2 to attack Feistel Networks whitened using affine layers. Theorem 1. Let , be linear -bit mappings, be an -bit permutation and let = ∘ ∘ . Furthermore, letˆ( ) be the HDIM of andˆ( ) be that of . Then it holds thatˆ(
Proof. We prove this result in two steps. First, the fact thatˆ( ∘ ) =ˆ( ) × ( −1 ) can be derived as follows:
We then note thatˆ( ∘ ) =ˆ(
which, using what we just found, is equal to (ˆ( −1 ) × ) = (ˆ( ) × ) , so thatˆ( ∘ ) = ×ˆ( ). This concludes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
The ANF and the LAT of an -bit permutation are connected in the sense that it is possible to determine the congruence modulo 4 of the LAT ℒ of anbit permutation given parts of its ANF. Indeed, as we describe in this section, this congruence only depends on the terms of degree − 1 in the ANF of the coordinates of .
The High-Degree Indicator Matrix of Feistel Networks
In what follows, we denote F an -round FN with bijective Feistel function of algebraic degree at most . The structure of a sample is given Figure 2 . It is possible to use the HDIM to analyse such generic structures.
Artifacts in the HDIM of Feistel Networks
The HDIM of a Feistel Network may yield interesting patterns depending on the degree of its Feistel functions, whether they are bijections or not and its number of rounds. These are formalized by Theorem 2 and its corollary (Corollary 1). These results link the maximum degree of the Feistel functions, the number of rounds and the presence or not of some patterns using the function :
where ⌊2 ⌋ = ⌊2 + 1⌋ = 2 and ⌈2 ⌉ = ⌈2 − 1⌉ = 2 . The general idea of the proof is to express the sum corresponding to coefficientˆ( )[ , ] using well-chosen variables ( , ) located in the middle of the encryption. The value of ( ) is then a function of degree ⌈ /2⌉−1 of ( , ) and that of is a function of degree ⌊ /2⌋−1 . The coefficients can thus be written aŝ
and the result is equal to 0 if ( , ) = ⌊ /2⌋−1 + ⌊ /2⌋−1 < 2 . If the Feistel functions are not bijective then a "trick" used to slightly decrease the degree in ( , ) of the output cannot be used, hence the small discrepancy in this case. The complete formal proof of this theorem is given in the full version of this paper [14] . Proof. Let and be such that F −1 fits the hypothesis of Theorem 2. The right word of the output of a F structure is the left word output by a F −1 structure. As each line of the HDIM corresponds to one output bit, the top rows of the HDIM of the -round FN are equal to the bottom rows of the same permutation reduced to ( − 1)-round. Because of Theorem 2, this bottom half is such that the first columns are all 0. Thus, the first columns of the first rows of the HDIM of a F are all equal to 0.
⊓ ⊔
To illustrate these theorems, we give the HDIM of the 4-and 5-round Feistel with 3-bit bijective Feistel functions picked uniformly at random whose LAT modulo 4 were given in Figures 1a and 1b . The Feistel functions must have an algebraic degree at most equal to 2. Since (2, 4) = 2 1 + 2 1 = 4 < 6, these HDIM must exhibit the patterns described in the theorems above. It is the case, as we can see below. The zeroes caused by Theorem 2 and Corrolary 1 are represented in grey:ˆ( 
Even though a F structure has an algebraic degree of 2 − 1 in the conditions of Theorem 2, the way in which this high degree is achieved is very structured: only half of the output bits actually have a maximum degree and the monomials of degree 2 − 1 can not contain the product of − 1 bits from the right side of the input. Thus, a simple analysis of the algebraic degree can be made more sophisticated by also investigating the possible structure of the monomials of highest degree. These patterns lead to the existence of distinguishers as long as the conditions necessary for Corollary 1 are satisfied. Table 3 shows the value of the number of rounds for which the conditions of Corollary 1 are satisfied for different values of , and in both the 1-to-1 case and the case where collisions in the Feistel functions are allowed. If real ciphers correspond to these parameters, we specify them. Note that the rotation applied to one of the branches in the round function of LBlock [15] does not change anything. The key-dependent linear FL layers in MISTY1 [16] do not protect from our distinguisher as well and may be included from any side for free. Table 3 : If = max ( , 2 ) then the 2 -bit permutation F exhibits an artifact of size 2 in its HDIM.
Bypassing Affine Whitening
In the context of component reverse-engineering/white-box cryptography, it may not be sufficient to be able to attack generic Feistel structure. Indeed, simply whitening a generic structure with secret affine layers can prevent many attacks from succeeding at small cost for the designer. For example, applying affine layers before and after a 5-round Feistel Network would prevent the yoyo-game used in [5] to be exploitable. Similarly, the recent attacks against ASASA [3, 4] are much more sophisticated than the attack against SASAS proposed by Biryukov et al. in the first place [19] . We also note that the secret structure of the S-Box of the last Russian standard primitives recently recovered was indeed whitened with seemingly random linear layers [8] .
As a consequence, we study the generic construction denoted AF A consisting in a F construction with secret Feistel functions preceded and followed by the application of independent and secret linear layers 5 . This structure has already been studied in [8] but our attacks are significantly more efficient. Note also that one of the S-Box of ZUC [20] has this structure: it is a 3-round Feistel Network composed with a bit rotation. Let us show how the HDIM and its artifacts we identified in the previous section can be used to attack permutations with AF A structures. The target of our attack, its result and its alternative representation. In Figure 3c , ′ is affine equivalent to .
Our attack works for a subset of all possible linear layers. We define = ∘ ∘ where has a F structure satifying the conditions of Theorem 2 and and are linear layers. The layer applied first must have a decomposition as follows:
and the layer applied last must have a similar one:
It is sufficient for such a decomposition of the first layer to exist that 0,0 is invertible. Indeed, we can then simply set = 0,0 , = 1,0 , = −1 × 0,1 and = 1,1 − × . Note that has to be invertible since is invertible. Similarly, it is sufficient that 1,1 is invertible to decompose the final layer. We define ′ using these decompositions so that is equal to:
A graphical representation of the relation between , ′ and is provided in Figures 3a and 3b . As satisfies the condition of Theorem 2, its HDIM is such thatˆ( )[ , ] = 0 if < or < . Applying Theorem 1 gives us that the HDIM of ′ is equal tô
ℎ being the bottom-right part ofˆ( ). Like inˆ( ), it holds thatˆ( ′ )[ , ] = 0 if < or < . Another way to see why this holds is shown in Figure 3c . Indeed, ′ can be written as a F structure, like , where -bit linear permutations are applied only on two branches and where the Feistel functions ′ are obtained from compositions of , ′ , , ′ and , as well as the addition of and ′ for the first and last rounds. We deduce that if indeed has a AF A structure satisfying the conditions for Theorem 2, then the following equation with unknowns the × binary matrices and ′ must have at least one solution:
where ℎ 1,1 is the bottom right corner ofˆ( ). This system has 2 2 unknowns and 3 2 equations, meaning that it is unlikely to have solutions if is a random permutation. However, if it does have a solution then we deduce both that has an AF A structure and the expression of parts of the linear layers. We summarize these results in the following attack.
Attack 1 (Partial Recovery Against AF A) Let be a 2 -bit permutation. It is necessary for to be in AF A for some ( , ) satisfying Theorem 2 that the equation
where ℎ is an unknown × matrix, has at least one solution. The unknowns are the coefficients of the × matrices and ′ , so that 2 2 Boolean variables must satisfy 3 2 equations corresponding to the zeroes in the right hand side.
This distinguisher requires the full code-book and as much time as is needed to compute the HDIM and solve a system of equations. Since the system is small, the bottle-neck is the computation of the HDIM which can be done in time O( 2 2 ) where is the branch size. We can use the exact same reasoning to attack one more round if the decomposition of and involve the same "linear Feistel function" . This happens in particular if = −1 . In this case, we can use the distinguisher obtained from the following attack.
Attack 2 (Partial Recovery Against
Let be a 2 -bit permutation. In order for to be in AF A for some ( , ) satisfying Corollary 1 in such a way that the linear layers are the inverse of one another, it is necessary that the equation
where ℎ 0,1 , ℎ 1,0 and ℎ 1,1 are unknown × matrices, has at least one solution.
The unknowns are the coefficients of the × matrices , so that 2 Boolean variables must satisfy 2 equations corresponding to the zero in the right hand side.
Note that if there is a single whitening affine layer applied at some side, we have a similar system with 2 unknowns. If we consider one more round, we will have 2 equations as well. Therefore we can attack F A, where is the maximum number of rounds satisfying Corollary 1. Another view on this attack is given in Section 5.3.
The Impossible Monomials Attack
In the previous sections we used absent terms of highest degree to recover whitening linear layers from Feistel Networks. In this section we generalize this method to terms of lower degree and, as a result, we present an attack recovering a secret round function from a 5-round Feistel Network with bijections. Furthermore, we generalize this attack to more rounds if the degrees of the round functions are small.
Impossible monomials in Feistel Networks
Let be a 2 -bit F 4 −1 and let be the th output bit of ( 0 is the leftmost bit of ). We will denote by = {0, . . . , − 1} and = { , . . . , 2 − 1} the indices from the left and right halves respectively, and and the truncations of the function to the left and right half respectively. Consider the ANF of :
where and are vectors of input variables from the left and right halves respectively. We will now show that some monomials are impossible, that is, || = 0 for some , independently of the choice of the Feistel functions. To prove it, we will need the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. Let , ∈ F 2 be some vectors of variables and let : F 2 → F 2 be a Boolean function of degree at most . Then if some term in the ANF of ( ⊕ ) has degree on variables from , then it has degree at most − on variables from . In particular, there are no terms of degree on and non-zero degree on . Proof. By the Möbius transform, the term of degree is present in the ANF of ∘ if and only if the sum of ∘ over F 2 is equal to 1. Since is a permutation, we have that ∑︀
( ). But this last sum is equal to zero because deg ≤ − 1. Therefore, there is no term of degree in the ANF of ∘ and we conclude that deg ( ∘ ) ≤ − 1.
We now formally describe classes of impossible monomials using the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let and its ANF be as defined before. Then || = 0 if one of the following holds:
1. ∈ and ℎ ( ) = ; 2. ∈ and ℎ ( ) = − 1, ℎ ( ) = − 1; 3. ∈ and ℎ ( ) = − 1, ℎ ( ) = ; 4. ∈ and ℎ ( ) = , ℎ ( ) = − 1.
Proof. Points 3-4 are part of Theorem 2 and are presented here for the sake of completeness. It is left to prove points 1 and 2.
1. Consider the 4-round integral characteristic from Figure 4 . Let be any cube which contains the whole left part. From the integral characteristic it follows that the sum of over the cube has zero on the right side. Therefore by the Möbius transform the corresponding ANF coefficients are zero. 2. Let 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 : F 2 → F 2 be the round functions of . The equation for the right half of the output is then given by:
Clearly, the first two terms do not contain any monomial of degree − 1 on and − 1 on . Consider the expression 2 ( ⊕ 1 ( ⊕ 0 ( ))). Assume that a term with degree −1 on both and is present in the ANF of the expression. Then the term is present in the expansion of some product of at most − 1 bits, where the bits are output bits of the expression ( )⊕ 1 ( ⊕ 0 ( )), i.e. in the term each of the −1 factors is either a bit from ( ) or from 1 ( ⊕ 0 ( )). Note that the term may not be generated by choosing bits only from ( ), because in that case there will be no variables from in it. Therefore there are at most − 2 bits taken from the outer ( ); − 1 variable from and at least one variable are taken from 1 ( ⊕ 0 ( )). It means that there exists a monomial function such that ∘ 1 ( ⊕ 0 ( )) contains term of degree − 1 on and degree at least 1 on . By Lemma 4, ∘ 1 has degree at most − 1 and by Lemma 3 there can not be such term in ∘ 1 ( ⊕ 0 ( )).
An Attack on 5-round Feistel Network
In this section we use the impossible monomials to attack 5-round Feistel Network built from permutations. The key idea is to observe the presence of some 4-round impossible monomials in the 5-round network and extract some information about the last round function. Consider some monomial which is impossible at the right side of a 4-round Feistel Network. We now add the 5th round. If we observe on the left side, then we know that this monomial has come from the last round function. Otherwise, we know that it has not come from the last round function and it gives us some information as well. Using these observations we build a system of linear equations where the unknowns are the ANF coefficients of the coordinates of the last round function. By solving the system we recover the ANF coefficients and hence the function itself. Note that in order to compute the ANF, we have to obtain the full codebook. Note that the 4-round impossible monomials which are still impossible in a 5-round Feistel Network do not leak any information about . For example, since Feistel Network is a bijection, the monomial of degree 2 is impossible for any number of rounds but it can not be used in the attack. However it is the only such monomial. Therefore we can use 2 − 1 impossible monomials from the first group of Theorem 3 and 2 ones from the second group. Each such monomial yields an equation per each bit of . There are 2 unknown coefficients in the ANF of so the number of equations will be enough to recover for all and hence with high probability. Note that we can recover only up to xor with a constant because the constant may propagate through the Feistel Network and merge with other round functions (see the introduction of [5] for a more detailed explanation of this phenomenon).
The complexity of the attack is (2 3 ) and is dominated by generating the equation matrix, which is the same for all output bits (the only difference is the target vector). For each of the 2 possible terms in the ANF of we compute the ANF of the term applied after in time (2 2 ) and then we check if this term generates the impossible monomials. The next step is to solve the systems. Since the equation matrix is the same for all output bits, we can do some precomputation (for example the LU-decomposition) once and solve all systems of equations very fast. Computing the target vectors is dominated by computing the ANF of 5 for ∈ which takes total time of ( 2 2 ). As a consequence of the algebraic nature of the attack, if the round function has lower degree, then the complexity decreases. Indeed, there are less unknowns and therefore both steps of generating the equation matrix and solving the systems take less time. As an edge case, consider the 5 structure where the affine layer can be seen as the 6th round with a function of degree 1. The complexity of recovering the affine round is ( 2 2 ), as was shown in Section 4.2. Note that the attack can be run in the reverse direction as well, so that we recover the first round function instead of the last one.
We have implemented the attack in Sage [21] . We successfully attacked a 5-round Feistel Network with bijections and branch size of up to 9 bits and recovered the outer secret round functions in a few minutes on a modern laptop.
A Generalization of the Attack on Feistel Networks with Low Degree Round Functions
When the round functions in a Feistel Network have low degree, the degree deficiency is decreasing slowly and as a result impossible monomials may exist for more than 5 rounds. Moreover, since there are less unknowns to recover, we need less impossible monomials to mount the attack.
In the following theorem we give a lower bound on the maximum number of Feistel rounds for which the large class of monomials is impossible. Namely, this class is point 1 from Theorem 3. The size of the class is 2 , which is enough to recover a round function of full degree. Therefore this is the lower bound on maximum number of rounds that can be attacked using the ANF recovery technique from Section 5.2. Proof. Let || be the input to . Consider the degrees on the variables from at the intermediate states. Initially, the degrees are 1 on the left and 0 on the right. After the first round the degrees are the same, because input to the round function has no variables from . Now if we have the respective degrees 1 , 2 at some point and we add a swap and xor with the round function, the degrees become ( 2 , · 1 ), 1 . Then for 2 rounds the degrees are , 1, for 3 rounds -2 , , and, in general, for rounds the degrees are −1 , −2 . Therefore, when −2 < , the -round Feistel Network has no monomials with degree on in the right branch of the output.
As a corollary of the theorem, we can attack a 2 -bit F if −3 < . Note that for the 5-round Feistel with bijections which we attacked in the previous section this bound is not satisfied (for ≥ 3):
5−3 = ( − 1) 2 > , i.e. we attacked more rounds than we could attack by Theorem 4. Though we expect that the bound is tight for the specified class of monomials in FN with non-bijective round functions, there are another classes of impossible monomials for Feistel Networks with more rounds. Moreover, if the degree is low, there are less ANF coefficients to recover and, therefore, smaller classes of impossible monomials may be enough for attack. As an edge case, consider an additional round function of degree 1 (a linear function). The impossible monomials of degree 2 −1 from Corollary 1 can be used to recover such round function, as was shown in attacks from Section 4.2. The maximal number of rounds (without the last linear one) for this attack is given by the condition ( , ) = ⌊ /2⌋−1 + ⌈ /2⌉−1 < 2 (or 1 more round if the Feistel functions are bijections). In general case, if the Feistel functions are bijections, we can attack 5 normal rounds plus 1 linear round.
Relationship Between Our Results and Other Attacks

Integral Attacks
The HDIM has a simple integral interpretation. Indeed, its coefficients correspond to the presence or not of some monomials in the ANF of its coordinates. They thus correspond to coefficients in said ANF which can be computed using the Möbius transform:ˆ(
where is the vector where all elements are equal to 1 except in position . This has two consequences.
1. we can compute the HDIM of an -bit permutation in time O( 2 −1 ), and 2. zeroes in column imply the existence of an integral distinguisher.
In light of this, we state the following corollary of Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 (Integral Distinguisher for F ). Let be a 2 -bit F and suppose that one of the following conditions holds:
-the Feistel functions are bijections and ( , − 1) < 2 , or -the Feistel functions are not bijections and ( , ) < 2 .
Then there exists an integral distinguisher with data and time complexity 2 2 −1 for this structure, namely
for all < and < . In other words, the sum of the right words of ( ) is equal to 0 over a cube where one bit of the input right word is fixed to 0.
We notice a relation between our attacks and the so-called division property. This tool for finding integral attacks was introduced by Todo in [9] and later used by the same author to attack the full MISTY1 [22] . In his seminal paper, Todo gives some integral distinguishers against Feistel Network for various block sizes, number of rounds, degree of the Feistel functions for both bijective and non-bijective Feistel functions. Interestingly, his results are extremely similar to ours! Indeed, while there is no generic formula in Todo's paper, the application of his algorithm shows the existence of cubes of size 2 − 1 whose sum is equal to 0 for a number of rounds identical to the ones we predicted. In fact, results about the division property of the output of a Feistel Network can be extracted from its HDIM. To explain this, we first recall the definition of the division property.
Definition 7 (Division Property). Let X be a multiset of F 2 and be an integer of [0, ]. We say that X has the division property if, for all in F 2 such that hw( ) ≤ , ⨁︀
This property is further generalized into the vectorial division property which we define in the particular case of a Feistel Network.
Definition 8 (Vectorial Division Property (for Feistel Networks)). Let X be a multiset of (F 2 ) 2 and , be integers of [0, ]. We say that X has the collective division property ( , ) if, for all , in F 2 such that hw( ) ≤ and hw( ) ≤ , ⨁︀ ( , )∈X = 0.
In particular, Todo applied his technique to 2 -bit F . The integral distinguisher against the highest number of rounds correspond to integrals over cubes of size 2 − 1 were the constant bit has to be on the left side. 6 As we have seen, summing over such a cube is equivalent to computing half of the lines of the HDIM of the function.
Let be a 2 -bit F , denote the left input bits, denote the right ones and and denote its left and right output halves so that ( || ) = ( || )|| ( || ). Suppose that the top left corner of the HDIM of is all zero. We deduce that the following holds for any cube of dimension 2 − 1 where the bit at index ≤ is fixed and for any ≤ : ⨁︀ ∈ ( ) · ( ) = 0. This can also be written as
where is the element of F 2 equal to 0 except at position where it is equal to 1. In other words, for all in F 2 , hw( ) ≤ 1 implies that ⨁︀ ∈ ( ( )) = 0, which means that the image of has vectorial division property 1,0 . The HDIM of Feistel Networks can thus be interpreted as describing the vectorial division property of each output half!
The relation between the ANF and integral attacks is further stressed by the attack we described in Section 5. Indeed, the complexity of this attack is very similar to that of the integral attack against 5-round FN with bijective Feistel functions described in [5] .
Conclusion
Investigating surprising visual patterns in the LAT of Feistel Network lead us to interesting results. To explain them, we introduced the high-degree indicator matrix (HDIM). It causes a form of linearity of the LAT modulo 4 and is related to the presence (or lack thereof) of some monomials in the ANF of the permutation. We identified patterns in the distribution of these monomials for Feistel Networks and provided theorems allowing us to predict the existence of these patterns (Theorem 2 and Corollary 1). More generally, we showed how the predictable absence of some monomials can be leveraged to attack a Feistel Network in an impossible monomial attack. We also drew some connections between our results and integral distinguisher.
